INSTRUCTOR:

Professor Florian M. Hollenbach

Email: fhollenbach@tamu.edu; Web: fhollenbach.org

Office: 332 LASB; Phone: 979-845-5021

Office Hours: By appointment via:https://appoint.ly/s/florian.hollenbach/introduction

CLASS MEETINGSS:

Thursday, 8:30 am - 11:20 am

Class Location: ALLN 2064

CLASS WEBSITE:

The syllabus may be changed through out the semester. The most updated version will be on my website at http://fhollenbach.github.io/Pols627_2020 and will reflect any schedule changes. I will share additional material on the course Google Team Drive.

All assignments are to be submitted electronically via email to fhollenbach@tamu.edu

COURSE DESCRIPTION:

The goal of this course is to cover fundamental concepts in Comparative Political Economy CPE) and provide an overview of the literature in the field. We will cover a wide range of topics and research approaches, often focusing on the interaction between politics and markets. Throughout the semester we will cover both developed and less developed countries. While there are no prerequisites to this course, students will encounter and will have to learn fundamental concepts in economics and other related fields.

READINGS & EXPECTATIONS:

We will be reading both articles and book chapters throughout the semester. Readings under the header Additional Readings are not required, but suggestions for those interested in the particular topic (see exception for in-class Presentations and Discussion Papers). This is a PhD student level seminar; as such I expect all students to come to class prepared, having read all required material prior to sending discussion questions on Wednesday mornings. I also expect you to complete relevant assignments on time.

Some of the weeks have substantial amounts of readings that may take significant time to get through. Make sure you start early enough. Additionally, some of the methodological work will be difficult. It is okay if you do not fully understand everything before coming to class, that is what our class meetings are for. Nevertheless, read carefully and at least try to understand each article/chapter. You should be able to discuss all of the required readings in class.

If you have not done so, I would advise you to develop a consistent system of reading and taking notes. We will discuss some approaches to reading early in the semester.

Since we will read large parts of them, you should acquire the following books:

Required Books:

• Przeworski, Adam. 2003. “States and Markets: A Primer in Political Economy.” Cambridge University Press.
• Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2006. “Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.” Cambridge University Press.

When reading you should think about questions such as:

1. Question/Framing: What is the question the authors are trying to answer in this work? Is this work important?

2. Theory: Is there an original contribution in the theoretical part of the work? Is the theoretical argument coherent? Are the mechanisms elaborated sufficiently? Are the assumptions plausible? Do the hypotheses follow logically from the theoretical argument? Are there theoretical implications that the authors missed?

3. Research Design: What is the unit of analysis? What is the research design? Does the research design allow the authors to test the specified hypotheses? Does it allow them to answer the question posed in their work? Are there important issues the authors missed? How could the research design be improved? Does the research design allow for causal identification? If not, why not? Is the description of the research design sufficient?

4. Data: Are variables adequately measured and do they correspond to the concepts of interest? Could we improve the authors’ measures? Are other (better) data available to investigate these questions? Is the description of the data sufficient to replicate the authors’ results?

5. Findings: Are the results correctly interpreted? Are the findings substantively important? How do the results correspond to the theory? Are there other potential explanations that are not ruled out by the research design? Are the authors interpreting the results causally? If so, is that justified?

6. Writing: Which sections of the paper are well/poorly written? Why? Are there parts that are particularly exciting/convincing? If so, for what reason? Does the introduction make you want to continue reading the work? What do you think about the overall structure of the work? Pay particular attention to the abstract and introduction.

LEARNING OUTCOMES:

At the end of the semester, after completing this course, students are expected to:

• Have a general knowledge of the literature in comparative political economy (CPE)
• Have an understanding of most common research designs in CPE
• Have a more thorough understanding of one of the weekly topics
• Have completed an original research paper in CPE

COURSE STRUCTURE:

The class will meet once a week from 8:30 am to 11:20 am on Thursday. In most weeks, class will be a mixture of lecture, exercise, and class discussion. In general, however, I expect the majority of class to be discussion based.

GRADING & RESPONSIBILITIES:

Your grade will be based on the following:

1. Participation (10%) – weekly grade average (10%) – (previously 15%)
2. Weekly Discussion Points (2% per week starting 01/23 - 24% )
3. In-Class Presentation (10%)
4. Discussion Paper (15%) – (previously 12.5%)
5. Final Paper Draft (4%) – (previously 7.5%)
6. Discussion of Paper Draft (7%) – (previously 7%)
7. Final Paper (30%) – (previously 25%)

• Participation: I will grade your participation each week (1-3 points) based on your contribution to the class discussion. Again, it is not the quantity but quality of participation that is important.

• Discussion Points: Each student should submit two discussion points on the weekly readings (starting 01/23). The two discussion points should be send to me in plain text (e.g., in the body of an email or as a .txt file) via email (to fhollenbach@tamu.edu). At the latest, you should send the two discussion points 24hrs before class (i.e., generally 8:30 am Wednesday morning). Your discussion points will shape class discussion and I will share all discussion points with the class on Wednesday evening. Each discussion point should be about one to two paragraphs long (but no more than 200 words) and raise questions or arguments specific to areas of the week’s readings. These should not be clarifying questions but raise points for discussion. Questions are good starting points, but you should attempt to also suggest an answer. Make sure to back up any points you raise. For example, it would not be sufficient to say ``the empirical model suffers from omitted variable bias’’. Instead, you should specify what exactly is missing and why it would a threat to inference. Moreover, criticism is again a great starting point, but try to be constructive in your discussion points. Try to make larger points about the readings, discussion points about statistical issues are rarely strong contributions. When thinking about your discussion points I would focus on points 2 & 3 in the reading guide above. Each discussion point should focus on a different part of the readings. I will grade your discussion points each week (9 total points), based on 1) importance/insight (0-3); 2) creativity/innovation (0-3); 3) writing (0-3). Late submissions will be penalized one point per hour late.

• In-Class Presentation: Each of you will give one in-class presentation (~12 min) about a paper in the supplementary reading list. You can pick any of the papers listed under the ``Additional Readings’’ list on the date you selected. For your presentation, imagine you are the author of the paper and are preparing a conference presentation for this paper. You should make sure that your presentation is correct and that you practice your presentation beforehand. The goal is for you to demonstrate your understanding of the paper and practice presentation skills. Keep in mind that other students in the class have not read the paper, so your presentation should make it accessible to all. Presentations will be graded on content and delivery.

• Discussion Paper: Each student will write a discussion paper on readings for one of the weeks. Your discussion paper should cover the required readings for the given week, plus two items from the Additional Readings’’ list. You do not need to talk about every single one of the required readings and your discussion paper should not just be a summary of the individual readings. Instead, try to synthesize the readings and find a common theme for the discussion (this might affect how you choose two of the additional readings). Your review should be approximately five pages long (double spaced, excluding the bibliography). You may want to pick a week that is related to your research paper. You are welcome to use parts of your discussion paper in the final paper. Discussion Papers are due prior to class of the selected week. Discussion papers should not be on the same topic as your in-class presentation.

• Final Paper DiscussionDraft: Share a draft of your final paper with a peer-review partner and me. I will assign peer-review partners based on interests/topic. You will share a draft of your final paper with your peer-review partner and me by Thursday, April 23rd 7 PM. Your draft should include all sections of the final paper, i.e., Introduction, Literature Review (must not be a separate section), Theory, Research Design, Empirical Analysis (if applicable), Conclusion. You do not have to have each section entirely written out. Parts of the draft can be outlines of individual sections or bullet points. While not everything has to be written out, your draft should contain all substantive import parts of the paper, however. This means at a minimum it should have a detailed outline of your theoretical argument and present some empirical results (if applicable).

• Discussion of Peer’s Draft: Instead of research presentations, we will have a discussion about each of your drafts. First your peer review partner will give a short overview over the paper and provide a short discussion of the draft (5-10 minutes). This should be similar to the duties of a discussant at conferences. You should be critical but constructive. Try to focus on 3-5 points, if possible these should be things that can be addressed in the next week. I will also add some comments. Then we will open the floor to the class for 5 - 10 minutes. We will spend approximately 15 minutes on each paper. We will do the discussion on Monday April 27th from 8:30 am - 10:30 am and 11:00 am - 1:00 pm. I would encourage all of you to participate the full four house, but if you have conflicts you may step out during the meeting. We will set up a schedule closer to April 27.

• Final Paper: Each of you will submit an original research project as the final assignment in the class. This paper should be a full research paper on a topic in comparative political economy. You should develop and empirically investigate a theoretical argument. The paper will have to make at least a theoretical or empirical contribution. You should submit a one paragraph proposal to me by week 6 (February 20th, 5pm) and I encourage you to come talk to me about your paper early and often. The final paper should be prepared as if you are submitting it to the American Journal of Political Science (AJPS). This means, the paper should be no longer than 10,000 words (including main body of text, notes, references, and the headers of tables and figures). You can find the full guide lines here: https://ajps.org/guidelines-for-manuscripts/manuscript-preparation/. Your paper must be original work and solo-authored. If you are thinking about using a paper that has been part of an assignment in a different course, you must first receive permission from me and the instructor in the course the paper was previously submitted to. Any final paper should include the following sections:

  1. Introduction
  2. Literature Setup
  3. Theory
  4. Research Design and Data
  5. Findings/Results
  6. Implications and Conclusions

Recall that your Discussion Paper may serve as a starting point for the literature setup in your final paper. The final paper is due at 11:59 pm on May 3rd, 2020. Your papers will be graded on originality, creativity, contribution to the literature, adequacy of the research design, empirical execution, and writing.

Grading Scale

The grading scale (in %) used in this class for all written assignments, and the overall class grade will be the following:

• A= 89.5
• B= 79.5–<89.5
• C= 69.5–<79.5
• D= 59.5–<69.5
• F <59.5

According to TAMU rules, I can not provide grades or updates on your grades via email. You are welcome to ask about your overall performance or specific grades at any point in the semester.

Writing

All written assignments will be graded based on both content and quality of writing. You can find helpful links on how to write well here: http://fhollenbach.org/WritingAcademic/. You may want to consult some of the books that are listed there. Writing is one of the most fundamental skills for academics. All of us struggle and it requires a lot of practice. Do not hesitate to ask for help. If you are having trouble, please come see me or visit the University Writing Center (see below).

WRITING HELP:

The University Writing Center (UWC), located in 1.214 Sterling C. Evans Library and 205 Business Library & Collaboration Commons, offers one-on-one consultations to writers. To find out more about UWC services or to schedule an appointment, call 458-1455, visit the web page at https://writingcenter.tamu.edu/, or stop by in person. This is a really great resource and I encourage you to take advantage of it.

ACADEMIC HONESTY:

“AN AGGIE DOES NOT LIE, CHEAT OR STEAL, OR TOLERATE THOSE WHO DO”

All students should follow the highest standards of academic integrity. Cheating or plagiarism will not be tolerated in any way. If you are unsure what entails plagiarism, come talk to me. For more info, see: http://student-rules.tamu.edu/aggiecode & http://aggiehonor.tamu.edu. Any cases of cheating or plagiarism will be submitted to the academic honor council.

CLASSROOM BEHAVIOR, PARTICIPATION, & ELECTRONIC DEVICES:

I expect you to attend class unless circumstances prohibit you from doing so. If you are sick, it is best to stay home. If you must miss class, please let me know in advance. Even if you are missing class, you are still responsible to do the readings and submit discussion questions and assignments. If there are special circumstances that prevent you from coming to class, please come talk to me early on.

Everyone needs to participate in class discussion. Participation is a large part of your grade and important. Quality of participation is more important than quantity, however. You have to provide evidence to substantiate your points, uninformed opinions are not helpful to the discussion. Your participation grade is based on the quality of your class participation. Please be respectful to your fellow class mates, do not interrupt them, and wait until called upon.

I encourage you not to use a laptop in class. Laptops have been shown to be a distraction not only to the students using them but also fellow class mates. A recent study has found that not having laptops in class can have a similar effect as hiring a SAT tutor. If you think you have good reasons for why you need to use a computer, however, you may do so.

In addition, please make sure your cell phones are on silent mode and refrain from using them during class time.

ABSENCES & LATE POLICY:

Except in the case of observance of a religious holiday, to be excused, the student must notify his or her instructor in writing (acknowledged e-mail message is acceptable) prior to the date of absence. In cases where advance notification is not feasible (e.g. accident or emergency) the student must provide notification by the end of the second working day after the absence. This notification should include an explanation of why the notice could not be sent prior to the class. Accommodations sought for absences due to the observance of a religious holiday can be sought either prior or after the absence, but not later than two working days after the absence. Legitimate circumstances include religious holidays, illness, serious family emergencies and participation in group activities sponsored by the University, etc. See http://student-rules.tamu.edu/rule07 for additional information.

All assignments are due on their due date at the specified time (or end of business, i.e., 5 pm, if unspecified). Unexcused late work will be penalized by a 7.5 percentage point deduction for each 24hrs your work is late (see exception for Discussion Poiunts). For example, if you hand in the assignment on the same day it is due, but after the specified time, your maximum score will be 92.5%. If you hand in your assignment more than 24hrs late, e.g., 5:00 pm the next day, your maximum score will be 85%, after 48hrs it would be 77.5%, and so on. Late work will be excused only in the case of university-excused absences. Only under special circumstances will I make exceptions to these rules.

RE-GRADING POLICY:

Students that want to appeal a grade received on an exam or assignment must submit a regrading request in written form (e.g., email). This request has to be turned in within five working days after the graded exams or assignments are returned to the class. The written statement must explain exactly why the student believes the current grade is incorrect. I will then regrade the entire assignment extra carefully. NOTE, as a consequence your grade may go up or down.

COMMUNICATION:

The best place to ask questions is in the classroom. If your question is not related to class material or relevant to other students, we can discuss it after class. You can generally expect me to reply to emails within 24 hours during the work week.

I encourage all of you to visit my office hours to discuss any difficulties with the readings, class, or your assignments/research.

DISABILITY:

All discussions will remain confidential. Texas A&M University is committed to providing equitable access to learning opportunities for all students. If you experience barriers to your education due to a disability or think you may have a disability, please contact Disability Resources in the Student Services Building or at (979) 845-1637 or visit https://disability.tamu.edu/ . Disabilities may include, but are not limited, to attentional, learning, mental health, sensory, physical, or chronic health conditions. All students are encouraged to discuss their disability related needs with Disability Resources and their instructors as soon as possible.

Title IX and Statement on Limits to Confidentiality

Texas A&M University and the College of Liberal Arts are committed to fostering a learning environment that is safe and productive for all. University policies and federal and state laws provide guidance for achieving such an environment. Although class materials are generally considered confidential pursuant to student record policies and laws, University employees – including instructors – cannot maintain confidentiality when it conflicts with their responsibility to report certain issues that jeopardize the health and safety of our community. As the instructor, I must report (per Texas A&M System Regulation 08.01.01) the following information to other University offices if you share it with me, even if you do not want the disclosed information to be shared: Allegations of sexual assault, sexual discrimination, or sexual harassment when they involve TAMU students, faculty, or staff, or third parties visiting campus. These reports may trigger contact from a campus official who will want to talk with you about the incident that you have shared. In many cases, it will be your decision whether or not you wish to speak with that individual. If you would like to talk about these events in a more confidential setting, you are encouraged to make an appointment with the Student Counseling Service https://scs.tamu.edu/. Students and faculty can report non-emergency behavior that causes them to be concerned at http://tellsomebody.tamu.edu.

DIVERSITY POLICY:

The Department of Political Science supports the Texas A&M University commitment to diversity, and welcomes individuals from any racial, ethnic, religious, age, gender, sexual orientation, class, disability, and nationality. (See https://diversity.tamu.edu/). In the spirit of this vital commitment, in this course each voice in the classroom has something of value to contribute to all discussions. Everyone is expected to respect the different experiences, beliefs and values expressed by fellow students and the instructor, and will engage in reasoned discussion that refrains from derogatory comments about other people, cultures, groups, or viewpoints.

Changes to Syllabus

I reserve the right to update/modify/clarify the syllabus with advance notification.

The most recent version of the syllabus will always be available on my website at: http://fhollenbach.github.io/Pols627_2020.

Class Schedule

Week 1 (01/16): Introduction to Comparative Political Economy

• Introduction, Syllabus, Logistics

Introduction Political Economy

Readings:

• Przeworski, Adam 2003. “States and Markets: A Primer in Political Economy.” Chapters 1-3 & 5.
• Smith, Adam. 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Book I, Chapters 1 & 2, Book IV, Chapter 2. In public domain, e.g., here
• Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. 1848. The Communist Manifesto. In public domain, e.g., here

Week 2 (01/23): PE of Economic Development, Institutions, & Growth Models

Presentation: Max Allamong

Readings:

• Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson. 2001. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.” American Economic Review, 91(5):1369–1401.
• Sokoloff, Kenneth, L., and Stanley L. Engerman. 2000. “Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14 (3): 217-232.
• Nunn, Nathan. 2008. “The Long-term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 123(1): 139–176.
• Dell, Melissa. 2010. “The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining Mita.” Econometrica. 78(6):1863–1903.

Supplementary Readings:

• Acemoglu, Daron. 2009. “Introduction to Modern Economic Growth.” Princeton University Press. Pages 3-46, skim the rest of chapter 2. Available here
• Banerjee, Abhijit, and Lakshmi Iyer. 2005. “History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India.” American Economic Review, 95 (4): 1190-1213.
• Glaeser, Edward L. and Rafael La Porta and Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer. 2004. “Do Institutions Cause Growth?” Journal of Economic Growth 9: 271-303.
• Nunn Nathan and Nancy Qian. 2011. “The Potato’s Contribution to Population and Urbanization: Evidence from a Historical Experiment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 126 (2): 593-650.
• Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James Robinson. 2002. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution.“Quarterly Journal of Economics. 107(4): 1231-1294.
• Jones, Benjamin F. and Benjamin A. Olken. 2005. “Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 120(3): 835-864.
• Pomeranz, Kenneth. 2000. “The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy.” Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Wade, Robert. 1990. “Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization.” Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Gerschenkron, Alexander. 1962. “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective.” Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• North, Douglas and Barry Weingast. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England.” Journal of Economic History. 49(4): 803-832.
• Sachs, Jeffrey D. 2003. “Institutions Don’t Rule: Direct Effect of Geography On Per Capita Income.” NBER Working Paper No.9490.
• Galiani, Sebastian and Ernesto Schargrodsky. 2010. “Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of Land Titling.” Journal of Public Economics 94(9-10): 700-729.

Week 3 (01/30): Origins of the State (in Europe):

Presentation: Niels Appeldorn

Readings:

• Tilly, Charles. 1990. “Coercion, Capital, and European States.“Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Chapters 1 & 2.
• Abramson, Scott F. 2017. “The Economic Origins of the Territorial State.” International Organization. 71(1): 97–130.
• Lee, Melissa and Zhang, Nan. 2017. “Legibility and the Informational Foundations of State Capacity.” Journal of Politics. 79(1): 118-132.
• Blaydes, Lisa and Christopher Paik. 2016. “The Impact of Holy Land Crusades on State Formation: War Mobilization, Trade Integration, and Political Development in Medieval Europe.” International Organization. 70(3):551–586.

Supplementary Readings:

• Abramson, Scott F. and David Carter. 2016. “The Historical Origins of Territorial Disputes.” American Political Science Review. 110(4): 675-698.
• Mann, Michael. 1984. “The autonomous power of the state: Its origins, mechanisms and results.” European Journal of Sociology. 25(2): 185-213.
• Besley, Tim and Torsten Persson. 2009. “The origins of state capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics.” American Economic Review 99:4: 1218-1244
• Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. “States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control.” Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Alesina, Alberto and Spolaore, Enrico. 2005. “War, Peace and the Size of Countries.” Journal of Public Economics. 89(7): 1333–1354.
• Stasavage, David. 2010. “When Distance Mattered: Geographic Scale and the Development of European Representative Assemblies.” American Political Science Review.
• Onarato, Massimiliano G. and Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage. 2014. “Technology and the Era of the Mass Army.” Journal of Economic History. 74(2): 449–481.
• Evans, Peter. 1992. “The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change.” In: Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman. eds. The Politics of Economic Adjustment. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 139-81.
• Boix, Carles. 2015. “Political Order and Inequality.” Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
• Dincecco, Mark. 2011. “Political Transformations and Public Finances: Europe, 1650–1913.” Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
• Besley, Tim and Torsten Persson. 2011. “Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters.” Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Boone, Catherine. 2003. “Political Topographies of the African State. Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice.” Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
• Kurtz, Markus J. 2013. “Latin American State Building in Comparative Perspective. Social Foundations of Institutional Order.” Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
• Dell, Melissa and Pablo Querubin. 2018. “Nation Building Through Foreign Intervention: Evidence from Discontinuities in Military Strategies.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 133(2): 701-764.
• Pierskalla, Jan H. and Alexander De Juan and Max Montgomery. 2019. “The Territorial Expansion of the Colonial State: Evidence from German East Africa 1890–1909.” British Journal of Political Science. 49(2): 711-737.

Week 4 (02/06): Regime Change

Presentation: Jonghoon Lee

Readings:

• Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2006. “Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.” Cambridge University Press. Read Chapters 2 & 4, skim 1, 3, 5 (I’d recommend reading the rest of the book)
• Boix, Carles and Susan Stokes. 2003. “Endogenous Democratization.” World Politics 55(4): 517-49.
• Treisman, Daniel. 2020. “Economic Development and Democracy: Predispositions and Triggers.” Annual Review of Political Science. In Print. Link
• Geddes, Barbara. 2010. “Changes in the Causes of Democratization through Time.” In: Todd Landman and Neil Robinson, eds. Sage Handbook of Comparative Politics. Link

Supplementary Readings:

• Ansell Ben and David Samuels. 2014. Inequality and Democratization: An Elite Competition Approach. Cambridge University Press. Selected Chapters
• Mukand, Sharun W and Dani Rodrik. 2020. “The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy.” The Economic Journal. Online First.
• Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2000. “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise?” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 115(4): 1167-1199.
• Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2017.“Why Did the WestExtend the Franchise? A Correction.”Unpublished manuscript
• Castañeda Dower, Paul and Evgeny Finkel and Scott Gehlbach and Steven Nafziger. 2020. “Democratization as a Continuous Choice: A Comment on Acemoglu and Robinson’s Correction to ‘Why Did the West Extend the Franchise?’” Journal of Politics. Online First.
• Castañeda Dower, Paul, Evgeny Finkel, Scott Gehlbach, and StevenNafziger. 2018. “Collective Action and Representation in Autocracies: Evidence from Russia’s Great Reforms.” American Political ScienceReview112 (1): 125–47.
• T. S. Aidt and P. S. Jensen. 2014. Workers of the world, unite! Franchise extensions and the threat of revolution in Europe, 1820-1938. European Economic Review, 72:52–75.
• S. Haggard and R. R. Kaufman. 2012. Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule. American Political Science Review, 106(03):495–516.
• T. S. Aidt and R. Franck. 2015. Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence From the Great Reform Act of 1832. Econometrica. 83(2):505-547.
• M. Ardanaz and I. Mares. 2014. Labor Shortages, Rural Inequality, and Democratization. Comparative Political Studies. 47(12):1639–1669
• E. Glaeser, G. Ponzetto, and A. Shleifer. 2007. Why Does Democracy Need Education? Journal of Economic Growth, 12:77-99.
• J. G. Hariri. 2012. The Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood. American Political Science Review, 106(03):471-494.
• A. Lizzeri and N. Persico. 2004. Why Did the Elite Extemd the Franchise? Democracy and the Scope of Government, With an Application to Britains Age of Reform. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(2):705-763.
• G. M. Luebbert. 1991. Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy. Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe. Oxford University Press.
• B. J. Moore. 1966. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
• A. Przeworski, M. E. Alvarez, J. A. Cheibub, and F. Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge University Press
• Magaloni, Beatriz. 2010. “The Game of Electoral Fraud and the Ousting of Authoritarian Rule.” American Journal of Political Science. 54(3)
• Freeman, John R. and Dennis P. Quinn. 2012. “The economic origins of democracy reconsidered.”” American Political Science Review 106(1):58-80.
• Albertus, Michael, and Victor Menaldo. 2014. “Gaming democracy: elite dominance during transition and the prospects for redistribution.” British Journal of Political Science. 44(3): 575-603.

Week 5 (02/13): Political Economy of Autocracies

Presentation: Mingsi Song & Lauren Bondarenko

Readings:

• Olson, Mancur. 1993. “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” American Political Science Review. 87(3): 567-76
• Svolik, Milan. 2012. “The Politics of Authoritarian Rule.” New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 & 2.
• Rozenas, Arturas and Yuri Zhukov. 2019. “Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: Evidence from Stalin’s ‘Terror by Hunger’.” American Political Science Review. 113(2): 569-583.
• Gandhi, Jennifer and Jane Lawrence Summer. 2020. “Measuring the Consolidation of Power in Non-Democracies.” Journal of Politics. Forthcoming. Link

Supplementary Readings:

• Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski. 2007. “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.” Comparative Political Studies. 40(11): 1279-2301.
• Ronald Wintrobe. 1990. “The Tin Pot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship.” American Political Science Review 84(3):
• Kim, Wonik and Gandhi, Jennifer. 2010. “Coopting Workers under Dictatorship.” Journal of Politics. 72(3): 656-658.
• Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. “Political Institutions under Dictatorship.” Cambridge University Press.
• Reuter, John Ora and David Szakonyi. 2019. “Elite Defection under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia.” American Political Science Review. 113(2): 552-568.
• Roberts, Margaret E. 2018. “Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China’s Great Firewall.” Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Hobbs, William R. and Margaret E. Roberts. 2018. “How sudden censorship can increase access to information.” American Political Science Review. 112(3): 621-636.
• King, Gary and Jennifer Pan and Margaret E. Roberts. 2017. “How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, not Engaged Argument.” American Political Science Review. 111(3):484-501.
• Gehlbach, Scott and Konstantin Sonin and Milan W. Svolik. 2016. “Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 19: 565-584.
• Boix, Carles and Milan W. Svolik. 2013. “The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions and Power-sharing in Dictatorships.” Journal of Politics 75(2): 300-316.
• Albertus, Michael. 2015. “Autocracy and Redistribution: The Politics of Land Reform.” New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
• Albertus, Michael, and Victor Gay. 2017. “Unlikely Democrats: Elite Uncertainty Under Autocracy and Democratization.” American Journal of Political Science. 61(3): 624-41.
• Meng, Anne. 2019. “Accessing the State: Executive Constraints and Credible Commitment in Dictatorships.” The Journal of Theoretical Politics. 33(4): 568-599.

Week 6 (02/20): Bureaucracies, Bureaucratic Capture, Corruption:

Presentation: Christy Phillips

Readings:

• Przeworski, Adam. 2003. “States and Markets: A Primer in Political Economy.” Cambridge University Press. Chapters 6 & 7.
• Fisman, Raymond. 2001. “Estimating the Value of Political Connections.” American Economic Review. 91(4): 1095-1102.
• Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan. 2010. “Electoral accountability and corruption: Evidence from the audit of local governments.” American Economic Review. 101(4): 1274-1311.
• McDonnell, Erin M. 2017. “Patchwork Leviathan: How Pockets of Bureaucratic Governance Flourish within Institutionally Diverse Developing States.” American Sociological Review. 82(3): 476–510.

Supplementary Readings:

• Vogler, Jan. 2019. “Imperial Rule, the Imposition of Bureaucratic Institutions, and their Long-Term Legacies.” World Politics. 71(4): 806-863.
• Tavits, Margit. 2007. “Clarity of responsibility and corruption.” American Journal of Political Science 51(1): 218-229.
• Pierskalla, Jan H. and Adam Lauretig and Andrew S. Rosenberg and Audrey Sacks. Forthcoming. “Democratization and Representative Bureaucracy - An Analysis of Promotion Patterns in Indonesia’s Civil Service, 1980-2015.” American Journal of Political Science. (On Google Drive).
• Dixit Avinash and John Londegran. 1996. “The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics.” Journal of Politics. 58(4): 1132-1155.
• Pepinsky, Thomas B. and Jan H. Pierskalla and Audrey Sacks. 2017. “Bureaucracy and Service Delivery.” Annual Review of Political Science. 20(1): 249-268.
• Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. ‘Protection for Sale’ American Economic Review 84, 833-850
• Olson, Mancur.1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press.
• Keefer, Philip. “Clientelism, credibility, and the policy choices of young democracies.” American journal of political science 51.4 (2007): 804-821.
• Harstad, Bard and Jakob Svensson. 2011. “Bribes, Lobbying, and Development.” American Political Science Review.
• Hidalgo, F. Daniel, and Simeon Nichter. “Voter buying: Shaping the electorate through clientelism.” American Journal of Political Science 60.2 (2016): 436- 455.
• Klašnja, Marko, Andrew T. Little, and Joshua A. Tucker. “Political corruption traps.” Political Science Research and Methods (2016): 1-16.
• Ferraz, Claudio, and Fred Finan. 2008. “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes.” Quarterly Journal of Economics.
• Huber and Shipan “Politics, Delegation and Bureaucracy” Chapter 15 in Wittman and Weingast (eds.) of Oxford Handbook of Political Economy
• Khwaja, Asim, and Atif Mian. 2005. “Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 120(4).
• Kiewiet and McCubbins. 1991. The Logic of Delegation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Treisman, Daniel. 2000. “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study.” Journal of Public Economics. 76(3): 399-458.
• Querubin, Pablo and James M. Snyder Jr. 2013. “The Control of Politicians in Normal Times and Times of Crisis: Wealth Accumulation by U.S. Congressmen, 1850–1880.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science. 8(4): 409-450.
• Gailmard, Sean and John W. Patty. 2012. “Formal Models of Bureaucracy.” Annual Review of Political Science. 15:353–377.
• Gailmard, Sean and John W. Patty. 2007. “Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise.” American Journal of Political Science. 51(4): 873-889.
• Schnakenberg, Keith E. and Ian R. Turner. 2019. “Signaling with Reform: How the Threat of Corruption Prevents Informed Policymaking.” American Political Science Review. 113(3): 762-777.
• Olken, Ben. 2007. “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia.” Journal of Public Economics. 115(2): 200-249.
• Bardhan, Pranab and Dilip Mookherjee. 2000. “Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels.” American Economic Review. 90(2): 135-139.
• Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. “Protection for Sale.” American Economic Review 84, 833-850.
• Evans, Peter. 1995. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Dube, Arin and Ethan Kaplan, and Suresh Naidu. 2011. “Coups, Corporations, and Classified Information” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 126(3): 1-35.
• McCubbins, Matthew D. and Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 3(2): 243-277.

Week 7 (02/27): Micro-Preferences & Preference Formation:

Presentation: Yeon Soo Park & Ali Kagalwala

Readings:

• Iversen, Torben and David Soskice. 2001. “An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences.” American Political Science Review. 95(4): 875-893.
• Rueda, David. 2005. “Insider-Outsider Politics in Industrialized Democracies: The Challenge to Social Democratic Parties.” American Political Science Review. 99(1): 61-74.
• Kedar, Orit. 2005.”When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in Parliamentary Elections.” American Political Science Review. 99(2): 185-199.
• Walter, Stefanie. 2017. “Globalization and the demand-side of politics: How globalization shapes labor market risk perceptions and policy preferences.” Political Science Research and Methods. 5(1): 55-80.
• Fernández-Albertos, José and Alexander Kuo. 2018. “Income perception, information, and progressive taxation: Evidence from a survey experiment.” Political Science Research and Methods. 6(1): 83-110.

Supplementary Readings:

• Rueda, David and Daniel Stegmueller. 2019. “Who Wants What? Redistribution Preferences in Comparative Perspective.” Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
• Rehm, Phillipp, Jacob S. Hacker, and Mark Schlesinger. 2012. “Insecure Alliances: Risk, Inequality, and Support for the Welfare State.” American Political Science Review. 106(20: 384-406.
• Fortunato, David and Clint S. Swift and Laron K. Williams. 2018. “All Economics is Local: Spatial Aggregations of Economic Information.” Political Science Research and Methods. 6(3): 467-487.
• Alt, James and Torben Iversen. 2017. “Inequality, Labor Market Segmentation and Preferences for Redistribution.” American Journal of Political Science. 61(1): 21-36.
• Mérola, Vittorio, and Agnar Freyr Helgason. 2016. “Are we in the same boat or not? The opposite effects of absolute and relative income shifts on redistributive preferences.” Journal of Politics. 78(4): 1107-1123.
• Gottlieb, Jessica and Guy Grossman and Amanda Robinson. 2018. “Do Men and Women Have Different Policy Preferences in Africa? Determinants and Implications of Gender Gaps in Policy Prioritization.” British Journal of Political Science. 48(3): 611-636.
• Shayo, Moses. 2009. “A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution.” American Political Science Review 103(1): 17-74.
• De la O, Ana and Jonathan Rodden. 2008. “Does Religion Distract the Poor?: Income and Issue Voting Around the World.” Comparative Political Studies 41(4-5): 437-76.
• Benabou, Roland and Jean Tirole. 2006. “Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 121(2): 699-746.
• Benabou, Roland and Efe A. Ok. 2001. “Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution: the POUM Hypothesis.” Quarterly Journal of Economics.
• Habyarimana, James and Macartan Humphreys and Daniel Posner and Jeremy Weinstein. 2007. “Why does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?” American Political Science Review. 101: 709-725.
• Linos, Katerina and Martin West. 2003. “Self-interest, Social Beliefs, and Attitudes to Redistribution.” European Sociological Review. 19: 393-409.
• Moene, Karl O., and Michael Wallerstein. 2001. “Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution.” American Political Science Review. 95(4):859-874.
• Piketty, Thomas. 1995. “Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 110(3):551-584.
• Scheve, Kenneth and David Stasavage. 2006. “Religion and Preferences for Social Insurance.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science. 1(3): 255-286.
• Ahlquist, John and Ben Ansell. 2017. “Taking Credit: Redistribution and Borrowing in an Age of Economic Polarization.” World Politics. 69(4): 640-675.
• Mughan, Anthony. 2007. “Economic Insecurity and Welfare Preferences. A Micro-Level Analysis.”” Comparative Politics 39(3):293-310.
• Corneo, Giacomo and Hans Peter Grüner. 2002. “Individual Preferences for Political Redistribution.” Journal of Public Economics. 83(1): 83-107.
• Rehm, Philipp. “Social Policy by Popular Demand.” World Politics.

Week 8 (03/05): Macro-Preferences & Preference Aggregation: Constitutions, Electoral Systems, & Elections:

Presentation: Keigo Tanabe

Readings:

• Cox, Gary. 1997. “Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems.” New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-2.
• Calvo, Ernesto and Jonathan Rodden. 2015. “The Achilles Heel of Plurality Systems: Geography and Representation in Multiparty Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science. 59(4): 789-805.
• Ichino, Nahomi and Noah L. Nathan. 2013. “Do Primaries Improve Electoral Performance? Clientelism and Intra-Party Conflict in Ghana.” American Journal of Political Science. 57(2): 428-441.
• Boone, Catherine and Michael Wahman. 2015. “Rural bias in African electoral systems: Legacies of unequal representation in African democracies.” Electoral Studies 40: 335-346.

Supplementary Readings:

• Cheibub, Jose Antonio. 2006. “Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy.” Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
• Cruz, Cesi, Julien Labonne, and Pablo Querubín. 2017. “Politician Family Networks and Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines.” American Economic Review, 107 (10): 3006-3037.
• Opalo, Ken Ochieng’. 2019. “Constrained Presidential Power in Africa? The Politics of Executive Rule-Making in Kenya, 1963-2013.” British Journal of Political Science. Online First.
• Boix, Carles. 1999. “Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies.” American Political Science Review. 93(3): 609-624. (the next five all speak to each other)
• Iversen, Torben and David Soskice. 2006. “Electoral Institutions, Parties, and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others.” American Political Science Review. 100(2): 165-181.
• Schröder, Valentin and Philip Manow. 2018. “An intra-party account of electoral system choice.” Political Science Research and Methods. First View. 1-17.
• Boix, Carles. 2010. “Electoral Markets, Party Strategies, and Proportional Representation.” American Political Science Review. 104(2): 404–413.
• Kreuzer, Marcus. 2010. “Historical Knowledge and Quantitative Analysis: The Case of the Origins of Proportional Representation.” American Political Science Review. 104(2): 369–392.
• Cusack, Thomas R. and Torben Iversen and David Soskice. 2010. “Coevolution of Capitalism and Political Representation: The Choice of Electoral Systems.” American Political Science Review. 104(2):393-403.
• Susan Stokes. 2005. “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina.” American Political Science Review. 99(3): 315-325.
• Ansolabehere, Stephen. 2007. “Voters, Candidates, and Parties.” In Handbook of Political Economy.
• Huber and Powell. 1994. “Congruence between Citizens and Policymakers in Two Visions of Liberal Democracy.” World Politics 46: 291-326.
• Besley and Coate. 1997. “An Economic Model of Representative Democracy.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 85-114.
• Lee, David and Enrico Moretti and Matthew J. Butler. 2004. “Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U.S. House,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(3), 807-859.
• Chen, Jowei. 2013. “Voter Partisanship and the Effect of Distributive Spending on Political Participation.” American Journal of Political Science. 57(1): 200-217.
• Calvo, Ernesto. 2009. “The Competitive Road to Proportional Representation: Partisan Biases and Electoral Regime Change under Increasing Party Competition.” World Politics. 61(2): 254-295.
• Lipset, Seymour M. and Stein Rokkan. 1967. “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction” in Lipset and Rokkan eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments, pp.1-64.
• Gingerich, Daniel W. 2019. “Ballot Reform as Suffrage Restriction: Evidence from Brazil’s Second Republic.” American Journal of Political Science. 63(4): 920-935
• Stokes, Susan C. and Thad Dunning and Marcelo Nazareno and Valeria Brusco. 2013. Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics. Cambridge University Press.
• Dunning et al. 2019. “Voter information campaigns and political accountability: Cumulative findings from a pre-registered meta-analysis of coordinated trials.” Science Advances 5(7):
• Downs, Anthony. 1957. “An Economic Theory of Democracy.” Harper.
• Gottlieb, Jessica and Guy Grossman and Horacio Larreguy and Benjamin Marx. 2019. “A Signaling Theory of Distributive Policy Choice: Evidence from Senegal.” Journal of Politics. 81(2): 631-647.
• Roberts, Andrew and Seawright, Jason and Cyr, Jennifer. 2013. “Do Electoral Laws Affect Women’s Representation?” Comparative Political Studies. 46(12):1555–1581.
• Mozaffar, Shaheen and James R. Scarritt and Glen Galaich. 2003. “Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa’s Emerging Democracies.” American Political Science Review. 97(3): 379-390.
• Huber, John D. 2012. “Measuring Ethnic Voting: Do Proportional Electoral Laws Politicize Ethnicity?” American Journal of Political Science. 56(4):986–1001.
• Hidalgo, F. Daniel and Simeon Nichter. 2016. “Voter Buying: Shaping the Electorate through Clientelism.” American Journal of Political Science. 60(2):436–455.
• Bhavnani, Rikhil R. 2009. “Do Electoral Quotas Work after They Are Withdrawn? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India.” American Political Science Review. 103(1):23–35.
• Crisp, Brian F. and Rachael E. Ingall. 2002. “Institutional Engineering and the Nature of Representation: Mapping the Effects of Electoral Reform in Colombia.” American Journal of Political Science 46(4): 733-748.
• Calvo, Ernesto. 2009. “The Competitive Road to Proportional Representation: Partisan Biases and Electoral Regime Change under Increasing Party Competition.” World Politics. 61(2): 254-295.
• Ahmed, Amel. 2013. “Democracy and the Politics of Electoral System Choice.” New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
• Lindberg, Staffan I. 2006. “Democracy and Elections in Africa.” Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
• Crisp, Brian F. and Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon and Bradford S. Jones and Mark P. Jones and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson. 2004. “Vote-seeking incentives and legislative representation in six presidential democracies.” Journal of Politics. 66(3): 823-846.

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(03/12) No Class; SPRING BREAK

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Week 9 (03/26): Macro-Preferences & Preference Aggregation: Political Parties & Legislative Organization AND ALSO Retrospective & Economic Voting :

Presentations: Andrea Junqueira & Thiago Moreira & James Dongjin Kim

Readings:

• Aldrich, John H. 1995. “Why Parties? Chicago, Il: University of Chicago Press. Chapters 1 & 2.
• Ziblatt, Daniel. 2017. “Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy.” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1.
• Martin, Lanny W. and Georg Vanberg. 2014. “Parties and policymaking in multiparty governments: The legislative median, ministerial autonomy, and the coalition compromise.” American Journal of Political Science. 58(4): 979-996.
• Powell, G. and G. Whitten. 1993. “A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context.” American Journal of Political Science. 37(2): 391-414.
• Duch, Raymond M. and Randy Stevenson. 2010. “The Global Economy, Competency, and the Economic Vote.” Journal of Politics.
• Williams, Laron K. and Guy D. Whitten. 2015. “Don’t Stand So Close to Me: Spatial Contagion Effects and Party Competition.” American Journal of Political Science.

Supplementary Readings:

• Ziblatt, Daniel. 2017. “Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy.” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2.
• Meng, Anne. 2019. “Ruling Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: Rethinking Institutional Strength.” British Journal of Political Science. Fist-View.
• Hibbs, Douglass A. 2006. “Voting and the Macroeconomy.” In: The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Chapter 31.
• Lindvall, Johannes. 2017. “Economic downturns and political competition since the 1870s.” Journal of Politics. 79(4): 1302-1314.
• Opalo, Ken Ochieng’. 2019. “Legislative Development in Africa: Politics and Postcolonial Legacies.” Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
• Rash, Bjorn Erik and Shane Martin and Jose Antonio Cheibub. 2016. “Parliaments and Government Formation: Unpacking Investiture Rules.” Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
• Bäck, Hanna, and Johannes Lindvall. 2015. “Commitment problems in coalitions: A new look at the fiscal policies of multiparty governments.” Political Science Research and Methods. 3(1): 53-72.
• Laver M. and K. Shepsle 1990. “Coalitions and Cabinet Government” American Political Science Review 84:873-90.
• Martin, Lanny W. and Stevenson, Randolph T. 2001. “Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science. 45(1): 33-50.
• Cox, Gary “The Organization of Democratic Legislatures.” In: Wittman and Weingast (eds.) of Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. (chapter 8)
• Baron D. and J. Ferejohn 1989. “Bargaining in Legislatures” American Political Science Review 83: 1181-206.
• Weingast, B. (1989). “Floor behavior in the U.S. Congress: committee power under the open rule.” American Political Science Review 83(3): 795-815.
• Krehbiel, K., K. A. Shepsle, et al. (1987). “Why Are Congressional Committees Powerful?” American Political Science Review 81(3): 929-945.
• McGillivray, Fiona. 1997. “Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs.” American Journal of Political Science 41(2): 584-607.
• Diermeier, Daniel, and Timothy Feddersen. 1998. “Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure.” American Political Science Review 92(3): 611-621.
• Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Headcounts in India. Cambridge University Press.
• T. Dunning and J. Nilekani. 2013. “Ethnic Quotas and Political Mobilization: Caste, Parties, and Distribution in Indian Village Councils.” American Political Science Review. 107(1):35–56.
• M. Hanusch and P. Keefer. Younger parties, bigger spender? Party age and political budget cycles. European Economic Review, 72:1–18, 2014.
• Hibbs, Douglas. 1977. “Political Parties and Macroconomic Policy.” American Political Science Review. 71:1467–1487.
• Diermeier, Daniel and Merlo, Antonio. 2000. “Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies.” Journal of Economic Theory. 94(1): 46-79.
• Huber, Evelyne and John D. Stephens. 2001. “Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets.’ Chicago, Il: University of Chicago Press.
• Rueda, David. 2005. Insider–Outsider Politics in Industrialized Democracies: The Challenge to Social Democratic Parties. American Political Science Review, 99(01):61–74, 2005.
• Yadav, Vineeta. 2011. Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
• Diermeier, Daniel, Eraslan, Hülya, and Merlo, Antonio. 2003. “A Structural Model of Government Formation.” Econometrica 71 (1): 27–70.
• Warwick, Paul. 1979. “The Durability of Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies.” Comparative Political Studies 11 (4): 465–98.
• Gill, Davidand Christine S. Lipsmeyer. 2005. “Soft Money and Hard Choices: Why PoliticalParties Would Legislate Against Soft Money Donations”Public Choice, 123(3-4): 411-438.
• Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Mary Stegmaier. 2013. “The VP-function revisited: a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after over 40 years.” Public Choice 157(3-4): 367-385.
• De La O, Ana L. 2013. “Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico.” American Journal of Political Science, 57(1):1–14.
• Imai, Kosuke and Gary King and Carlos Velasco Rivera. Forthcoming. “Do Nonpartisan Programmatic Policies Generate Partisan Electoral Effects? Evidence from Two Large Scale Randomized Evaluations.” Journal of Politics. Link
• Ferejohn, John. 1986. “Incumbent performance and electoral control.” Public choice 50(1):5–25.
• Tromborg, Mathias Wessel and Randolh T Stevenson and David Fortunato. 2019. “Voters, Responsibility Attribution and Support Parties in Parliamentary Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science. 49(4): 1591-1601.
• Fortunato, David and Matt W. Loftis. 2018. “Cabinet Durability and Fiscal Discipline.” American Political Science Review. 112(4): 939-953.
• Alt, James E., and Lassen, David Dreyer. 2006. “Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries.” American Journal of Political Science 50 (3): 530–50.
• Duch, Raymond M., and Stevenson, Randolph T.. 2011. “Context and Economic Expectations: When do Voters Get it Right?.” British Journal of Political Science 41 (01): 1–31.
• Kayser, Mark Andreas. 2005. “Who Surfs, Who Manipulates? The Determinants of Opportunistic Election Timing and Electorally Motivated Economic Intervention.” American Political Science Review 99 (01): 17–27.
• Palmer, Harvey D. and Guy D. Whitten. 1999. “The Electoral Impact of Unexpected Inflation and Economic Growth.” British Journal of Political Science. 29(4): 623-639.

Week 11 (04/02): Taxation:

Presentation: Joo Won Yi

Readings:

• Przeworski, Adam and Michael Wallerstein. 1982. “The Structural Dependency of the State on Capital.” American Political Science Review. 82(1): 11-21.
• Kasara, Kimuli. 2007. “Tax Me If You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy, and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa.” American Political Science Review. 101(1): 159-172.
• Scheve, Kenneth and David Stasavage. 2012. “Democracy, war, and wealth: lessons from two centuries of inheritance taxation.” American Political Science Review. 106(1): 81-102.
• Paler, Laura. 2013. “Keeping the public purse: An experiment in windfalls, taxes, and the incentives to restrain government.” American Political Science Review 107(4):706–725.
• Gadenne, Lucie. 2017. “Tax me, but spend wisely? Sources of public finance and government accountability.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 9(1):274–314.

Supplementary Readings:

• Levi, Margaret. 1988. Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Selected Chapters.
• Carrillo, Paul, Dina Pomeranz, and Monica Singhal. 2017. “Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 9 (2): 144-64.
• Beramendi, Pablo, and David Rueda. 2007. “Social democracy constrained: indirect taxation in industrialized democracies.” British Journal of Political Science 37(4): 619-641.
• Bates, Robert H and Donald Da-Hsiang Lien. 1985. “A note on taxation, development, and representative government.” Politics & Society 14(1):53–70.
• Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage. 2010. The Conscription of Wealth: Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation. International Organization, 64(04):529–561
• Timmons, Jeffrey F. 2010. Taxation and Representation in Recent History. The Journal of Politics. 72(01):191–208.
• de la Sierra, Raúl Sánchez. 2020. “On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo.” Journal of Political Economy 2020 128:1, 32-74
• Mares, Isabela. 2006. “Taxation, Wage Bargaining and Unemployment.” New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
• Cusack, Thomas R. and Pablo Beramendi. 2006. “Taxing Work.” European Journal of Political Research. 45(1):43-73.
• Queralt, Didac. 2017. “Protection Not for Sale, But for Tax Compliance.” International Studies Quarterly. 61(3):631–641.
• Mares, Isabela and Queralt, Didac .2015. “The Non-Democratic Origins of Income Taxation.” Comparative Political Studies. 48(14): 1974–2009.
• Eubank, Nicholas. 2012. “Taxation, Political Accountability, and Foreign Aid: Lessons from Somaliland.” Journal of Development Studies 48(4):465–480.
• Hollenbach, Florian M and Thiago Silva. 2019. “Fiscal Capacity, Income Distribution, and Taxation in Brazilian Municipalities.” Journal of Politics 81:1434–1445.
• Timmons, Jeffrey F and Francisco Garfias. 2015. “Revealed corruption, taxation, and fiscal accountability: Evidence from Brazil.” World Development. 70:13–27
• Weigel, Jonathan L. 2019. “The Participation Dividend of Taxation: How Citizens in Congo Engage More with the State when it Tries to Tax Them.” Working Paper. Link
• Fairfield, Tasha. 2013. “Going Where the Money Is: Strategies for Taxing Economic Elites in Unequal Democracies.” World Development. 47: 42-57.
• Beramendi, Pablo and Rogers, Melissa. 2020. “Disparate Geography and the Origins of Tax Capacity.” Review of International Organizations. First-View.
• Seelkopf, Laura and Moritz Bubek and Edgars Eihmanis and Joseph Ganderson and Julian Limberg and Youssef Mnaili and Paula Zuluaga and Philipp Genschel. 2020. “The Rise of Modern Taxation: a New Comprehensive Dataset of Tax Introductions Worldwide.” Review of International Organizations. First-View.
• Ganghof, Steffen. 2006. “The Politics of Income Taxation: A Comparative Analysis.” ECPR Press.

Week 12 (04/09): Monetary Policy & Finance:

Presentation: Brenna Armstrong

Readings:

• Clark, William R. and Mark Hallerberg. 2000. “Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy.” American Political Science Review, 94(2), 323-346.
• Hall, Peter and Franzese, Robert. 1998. “Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union.” International Organization. 52(3):505–535.
• Iversen, Torben and David Soskice. 2006. “New Macroeconomics and Political Science.” Annual Review of Political Science. 9:425-453.
• Mukherjee, Bumba and David A. Singer. 2008. “Monetary Institutions, Partisanship, and Inflation Targeting.” International Organization, 62(2):323–358.

Supplementary Readings:

• Friedman, Milton. 1968. “The role of monetary policy.” American Economic Review. 58(1): 1-17.
• Frieden, Jeff. 1991. Invested interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance. International Organization, 45(4):425–451
• A. Mian, A. Sufi, and F. Trebbi. The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis. American Economic Review, 100(5):1967–98, 2010
• W. Bernhard and D. Leblang. Democratic Institutions and Exchange-rate Commitments. International Organization, 53(1):71–97, 1999 – W. Bernhard and D. Leblang. Democratic Processes and Financial Markets. Pricing Politics. Cambridge University Press, 2006 – D. Campello. The Politics of Financial Booms and Crises Evidence From Latin America. Comparative Political Studies, 47(2):260–286, Feb. 2014 – E. Grossman and C. Woll. Saving the Banks The Political Economy of Bailouts. Comparative Political Studies, 47(4):574–600, Mar. 2014
• D. P. Quinn and C. Inclan. 1997. The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization. American Journal of Political Science. 41(3):771–813.
• D. A. Singer. 2010. Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes in the Developing World. American Political Science Review. 104(02):307–323. – M. Tomz. 2007. Reputation and International Cooperation. Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries. Princeton University Press. – S. Walter. 2015. Financial Crises and the Politics of Macroeconomic Adjustments. Cambridge University Press.
• Bernhard, W. and J. L. Broz and W. R. Clark. 2002. The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions. International Organization. 56:693–723
• Gourevitch, P. A. 1986. Politics in Hard Times. Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises. Cornell University Press.
• Hallerberg, Mark. 2002. Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions. International Organization. 56(4):775–802.
• Keefer, P. and D. Stasavage. 2002. Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments. International Organization, 56(4):751–774.
• Leachman, L. L. and G. Rosas and P. Lange and A. Bester. 2007. The Political Economy of Budget Deficits. Economics & Politics. 19(3):369–420.
• Schamis, H. 1999. Distributional Coalitions and Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America. World Politics. 51(2):236–268.
• Hall, Peter and Franzese, Robert. 1998. Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union. International Organization, 52(03):505–535.
• Clark, William R. 2009. “Capitalism, not globalism: capital mobility, central bank independence, and the political control of the economy.” Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Week 13 (04/16): Welfare State & Distributional Politics

Presentation: Jongwoo Jeong

Readings:

• Iversen, Torben and David Soskice. 2006. “Electoral Institutions, Parties, and the Politics of Class: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others.” American Political Science Review. 100(2): 165-181.
• Moene, Karl O. and Michael Wallerstein. 2001. “Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution.” American Political Science Review. 95(4):859-74.
• Rasmussen, Magnus and Carl Henrik Knutsen. 2020. “Reforming to Survive: The Bolshevik Origins of Social Policies.”. Working Paper (on Google Drive)
• Holland, Alisha C. 2016. “Forebearance.” American Political Science Review. 110(2): 232-246.

Supplementary Readings:

• Bradley, David and Evelyne Huber and Stephanie Moller and François Nielsen and John D. Stephens. 2003. “Distribution and Redistribution in Postindustrial Democracies.” World Politics. 55(2): 193-228.
• Meltzer, Alan H. and Scott F. Richard. 1981. “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government.” The Journal of Political Economy. 89(5):914–927.
• Mangonnet, Jorge and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2020. “Protests of Abundance: Distributive Conflict Over Agricultural Rents During the Commodities Boom in Argentina, 2003–2013.” Comparative Political Studies. Online First.
• Rueda, David and Daniel Stegmueller. 2015. “The Externalities of Inequality: Fear of Crime and Preferences for Redistribution in Western Europe.” American Journal of Political Science. 60(2): 472-489.
• Franko, William W. 2016. “Political Context, Government Redistribution, and the Public’s Response to Growing Economic Inequality.” Journal of Politics. 78(4): 957-973.
• Barth, Erling and Henning Finseraas and Karl O. Moene. 2015. “Political Reinforcement: How Rising Inequality Curbs Manifested Welfare Generosity” American Journal of Political Science. 59(3): 565-577.
• Hicks, Timothy, Alan M. Jacobs, and J. Scott Matthews. “Inequality and Electoral Accountability: Class-Biased Economic Voting in Comparative Perspective.” The Journal of Politics 78.4 (2016): 1076-1093.
• Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1990. “The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.” Princeton University Press (Chapter 1).
• Boix, Carles. 1998. “Political Parties, Growth and Equality.” New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
• Dixit, Avinash and John Londregan. 1998. “Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 113: 497-529.
• Holland, Alisha C. 2015. “The Distributive Politics of Enforcement.” American Journal of Political Science. 59(2): 357-371.
• Holland, Alisha C. 2017. “Forbearance as Redistribution.“New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
• Bechtel, Michael M. and Dominik Hangartner and Lukas Schmid. 2016. “Does Compulsory Voting Increase Support for Leftist Policy?” American Journal of Political Science. 60(3):752–767.
• Dahlberg, M. and K. Edmark and H. Lundqvist. Ethnic Diversity and Preferences for Redistribution. Journal of Political Economy, 120(1):41–76, 2012
• Hinnerich B.T. and P. Pettersson-Lidbom. Democracy, Redistribution, and Political Participation: Evidence From Sweden 1919–1938. Econometrica, 82(3):961–993, 2014
• Acemoglu, Daron. 2001. “Inefficient Redistribution.” American Political Science Review, null(03):649- 661, Sept. 2001
• Bradley, David and Evelyne Huber and Stephanie Moller and François Nielsen and John D. Stephens. 2003. “Distribution and Redistribution in Postindustrial Democracies.” World Politics. 55(2): 193-228.
• Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini 2003: The Economic Effects of Constitutions MIT Press
• Rueda, David and Jonas Pontusson. 2000. “Wage Inequality and Varieties of Capitalism” World Politics, 52, 350-383.
• Ansell. Ben. 2010. From the Ballot to the Blackboard. Cambridge University Press.
• Rueda, David, 2005: “Insider-Outsider Politics in Industrialized Democracies: The Challenge to Industrialized Democracies” American Political Science Review 99, 61-74.
• Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini 2003: The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Beramendi Pablo and C. Anderson (eds) Democracy, Inequality, and Representation.
• Beramendi, Pablo 2012. The Political Geography of Inequality. Regions and Redistribution. Cambridge University Press.
• Smith, David Austen. 2000: “Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation” Journal of Political Economy 108, 6, 1235-69.
• Lindert, Peter. 2004. Growing Public. Social Spending and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century. Cambridge University Press.
• Lipsmeyer, Christine S. 2011. “Booms and Busts: How Parliamentary Governments and Economic Context Influence Welfare Policy.” International Studies Quarterly, 55: 959-980.

Week 14 (04/24): Final Paper Discussions

Week 15 (05/03 at 11:59 PM) Final Paper Due